Philip Withnall
philip.withnall@collabora.co.uk 2015
Acceder al sistema de archivos
Daniel Mustieles
daniel.mustieles@gmail.com 2016-2020
Javier Mazorra
mazi.debian@gmail.com 2016, 2020

# Acceso al sistema de archivos

#

        Resumen

          There are a few anti-patterns to consider when accessing the file system.
          This article assumes knowledge of the standard
          GFile,
          GInputStream
          and
          GOutputStream
          APIs.

          Use E/S asíncrona para acceder a archivos. (Consulte la sección )

            Always use appropriate functions to construct file names and paths.
            ()

            Validate file paths are in the expected directories before using them.
            ()

            Use mandatory access control profiles to enforce constraints on file
            access.
            ()

# E/S asíncrona

Almost all I/O should be performed asynchronously. That is, without blocking the GLib main context. This can be achieved by always using the `*_async()` and `*_finish()` variants of each I/O function.

Por ejempl, `g_input_stream_read_async()` en lugar de `g_input_stream_read()`.

La E / S síncrona bloquea el bucle principal, lo que significa que otros eventos, como la entrada del usuario, los paquetes de red entrantes, los tiempos de espera y las devoluciones de llamadas inactivas, no se manejan hasta que vuelve la función de bloqueo.

Synchronous I/O is acceptable in certain circumstances where the overheads of scheduling an asynchronous operation exceed the costs of local synchronous I/O on Linux. For example, making a small read from a local file, or from a virtual file system such as /proc. For such reads, the low level functions `g_open()`, `read()` and `g_close()` should be used rather than GIO.

Files in the user’s home directory do not count as local, as they could be on a networked file system.

Note that the alternative – running synchronous I/O in a separate thread – is highly discouraged; see the threading guidelines for more information.

# Construcción de rutas de archivos

File names and paths are not normal strings: on some systems, they can use a character encoding other than UTF-8, while normal strings in GLib are guaranteed to always use UTF-8. For this reason, special functions should be used to build and handle file names and paths. (Modern Linux systems almost universally use UTF-8 for filename encoding, so this is not an issue in practice, but the file path functions should still be used for compatibility with systems such as Windows, which use UTF-16 filenames.)

For example, file paths should be built using `g_build_filename()` rather than `g_strconcat()`.

Doing so makes it clearer what the code is meant to do, and also eliminates duplicate directory separators, so the returned path is canonical (though not necessarily absolute).

As another example, paths should be disassembled using `g_path_get_basename()` and `g_path_get_dirname()` rather than `g_strrstr()` and other manual searching functions.

# Path Validation and Sandboxing

If a filename or path comes from external input, such as a web page or user input, it should be validated to ensure that putting it into a file path will not produce an arbitrary path. For example if a filename is constructed from the constant string ~/ plus some user input, if the user inputs ../../etc/passwd, they can (potentially) gain access to sensitive account information, depending on which user the program is running as, and what it does with data loaded from the constructed path.

This can be avoided by validating constructed paths before using them, using `g_file_resolve_relative_path()` to convert any relative paths to absolute ones, and then validating that the path is beneath a given root sandboxing directory appropriate for the operation. For example, if code downloads a file, it could validate that all paths are beneath ~/Downloads, using `g_file_has_parent()`.

As a second line of defense, all projects which access the file system should consider providing a mandatory access control profile, using a system such as AppArmor or SELinux, which limits the directories and files they can read from and write to.